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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
.JUE WHEELER, DAVID BOYD 




BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Salt Lake City has filed this appeal seeking to have 
this court uphold the constitutional validity of its or-
dinance allowing warrantless inspection of licensed 
l1rer taverns. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
AND PREFACE 
This matter was previously heard by the Honor-
tble D. Frank YVilkins of the Third Judicial District 
l 
I 
Court in and for Salt Lake County. The Salt LaKt I 
City Prosecutor and defendants' attorney orally agreel. 
to have the cases of the three defendants-responclenti 
consolidated for hearing before the said court to deter. 
mine the constitutionality of a Salt Lake City tarern. 
inspection ordinance, which ordinance underpinned all 
of their convictions in the Salt Lake City Court. Al-
though the record is sketchy, apparently the City Prose· 
cutor did not wish to hold the two defendants-respon· 
dents on their charge of interfering with an officer, ;11 
the discharge of his official duties, if the court held thr 
ordinance under which the police were acting unconsti-
tutional. Therefore, counsel stipulated orally to tht 
facts and submitted all three cases to the District Coun I 
based on the constitutionality of Section 19-4-6, Revisea 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah (1965). 
The District Court held the Salt Lake City ordi· 
nance unconstitutionally vague, broad and violatire of 
the defendants-respondents' right of privacy. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellant submits that the decision of the 
lower court should be reversed and that the ordinauce 
should be declared constitutional in all regards. 
FACTS 
The defendants, David Boyd and Joe Jack.soln, 
lie ed rJO n were arrested December 29, 1968, for an a g 
2 
tioll of Section 3:l-l-5, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, [Ttah ( 1965); i.e., interfering with a police officer 
\\'hile in the performance of his lawful duties on Decem-
ber 1968. On this date at approximately 2 :15 a.m., 
the Sall Lake City police officer entered the Regal 
Lounge for the purpose of making an inspection of 
premises licensed as a Class "C" beer parlor. The de-
fendants dashed a suspected glass of liquor from the 
11ffieer's hands and were subsequently arrested, tried in 
\he Salt Lake City Court and found guilty by Judge 
}Ielrin Morris on May 15, 1969. 
The defendant, Joe Wheeler, was arrested for a 
riolation of Section 19-4-6, Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, Utah ( 1965), for his actions on February 
Zi. 1969, at approximately 8 :30 p.m. On this date he 
refused to allow Salt Lake City police officers to make 
an inspedion of the Regal Lounge, for which offense 
he was tried April 24, 1969, and found guilty May 8, 
l01i9, by City Judge Melvin Morris. 
The three defendants consolidated an appeal to 
the Third District Court, stipulated to the general facts 
:11JJ submitted the case to Judge D. Frank \Vilkins on 
the constitutionality of Salt Lake City's inspection or-
ainanre, Section 19-4-6, Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, Utah (1965) T-2. Judge Wilkins ruled the 
ordinance unconstitutional by finding that it is vague, 
urerbroad and allows searches without a showing of 
probable cause and without a search warrant in viola-




THE QUESTIONED IS 
DEFINITE AND CLEARLY ,,VORDED TO I 
GIVE NOTICE TO A PERSON OF ORDINAR\· I 
INTELLIGENCE OF '¥HAT CONDUCT 1 
REQUIRED OR PROSCRIBED; THERE.! 
FORE, IT DOES NOT VIOLATE CONSTITr. 
TION AL STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW FOR AMBIGUITY, VAGUENESS 
OR BROADNESS. 
The test for vagueness and ambiguity is clearh 
set forth by many court decisions; a recent expression 
of the law has been made as follows: 
"A statute is void for vagueness whet1 it for· 
bids or requires the doing of an act in terms so 
vague that man of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as lo 
its application." Rollings v Shannan, 
F.Supp. 850, 589 ( 1968), quoting Zu:ecklen 
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249 (1967). 
The Salt Lake City ordinance in question reads as 
follows: 
"The police department shall be permitted. tii 
have access to all premises licensed or applymg 
for license under this chapter, and shall make 
. d" . t' f 'd em••·e•· and reporl perto zc inspec ions o sat pr ' ,, Sel'· 
its findings to the board of comm1ssioners. Lakt 
tion 19-4-6, Revised Ordinances of Salt 
CitJJ, Utah ( 1965) . (Emphasis added.) 
4 
[( would be difficult to draft an ordinance which made 
more clear the expected conduct. Clearly, under the 
ordinance, the police are to be given access to the 
licensed premises for the purpose of an inspection. 
Tile word "premises" is of clear and definite mean-
iiig to any intelligent persons, especially as limited by 
the word "licensed.'' These terms are further limited 
111 their scope by definition to include only those areas 
llf the building described in the license application. See 
Sectiuu IU-1-.J., Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 
['tah (1965); cf. Section 32-1-3, Utah Code Ann. 
(19.JilJ and Section 32-1-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
uo amended. Therefore, the "licensed premises" is only 
:1s broad as the licensee made it and is clearly not am-
biguous or indefinite. 
The only other word which can raise any question 
of ambiguity or vagueness is "inspection." It is ludi-
r:rous to assert that the type of inspection the police 
tould make must be defined in order that the tavern 
11wner should know what conduct is required of him 
1111der the section. The word "inspection" has definite 
meaning and informs the party that he must allow the 
police iu to "see or to view." See, 21 A. TV ords 
Pl1rr1scs, Hi2. Since the inspection is limited to the 
licensed premises," it is difficult to see how a more 
dear expression could be made, short of a check list 
rrf inspection written for each licensed premises. This 
JlPrsonified legislation cannot be demanded of a legisla-
tiYe body. 
5 
The defendants have also maintained that th 
d. . d f . e or· mance Is e ective for overbreadth in that the t' . . une ol 
mspection has not been outlined. It is important tii 
note that Salt Lake City has the absolute right ancl I 
power to: 
" ... license, tax, regulate or prohibit the sal I 
f. l' h b " S · e I o 1g t eer . . . • ecbon 37 -7 -9, Utah Code 'I 
Ann. (1953), as amended. 
These taverns are required to close by I :00 a.m. 
except during daylight savings time, at which time titer 
may remain open until 2 :00 a.m. Section 19-3-U, Rr-
vised Ordinance of Salt Lake City, Utah (1965). 
infractions of the State and City laws occur after those 
hours; to limit the right of inspection to only busines.1 , 
hours would make the City's right and power of regula- 1 
tion largely illusory. The city has merely chosen 
to exercise its power of regulation by requiring the 
right to inspect, as a condition precedent to obtaining 
a license, rather than absolutely prohibiting the sale 
of beer. This is certainly within its discretion ana 
clearly not an overly broad exercise of its power 
Further, it is an exercise of a right to which the licensee 
has impliedly consented by seeking a license. 
Other states have similar inspection requiremenb 
and an ordinance similar to our own, but one whicn 
specifically allowed inspections at any hour, has been 
successfully employed by our Sister State, New Jersey 
A. d 561 State v Zurawski, 88 N.J.Super.488, 215 .2 
(1965). Further, the writer has been unable to 







uverbrcadth. If the City has the right of warrantless 
inspection under the State statutes, that right cannot 
be limited simply to business hours. 
However, if this court felt that the inspection should 
be limited to business hours, which is in effect how it 
I has been employed, it should read "at reasonable times" 
· I 111to the ordinance. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
allowed state courts to judicially interpret ordinances to 
keep them within constitutional bounds. See Chaplin-
sky v New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942). To 
so interpret the ordinance would fulfill this court's duty 
to use every reasonable presumption to uphold the con-
stitutionality of a validly passed piece of legislation. 
One could point out improvements which could be 
ma<le in most any legislative enactment, but such pos-
sible improvements do not make the legislation invalid. 
Legislation is presumed constitutional and every rea-
sonable presumption should be employed to sustain its 
only upon a showing by clear and convincing 
eridenee is a statute to be ruled unconstitutional. 2 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, §4106 (3rd Ed. 
Gord v Salt Lake Cit,y, 20 Ut.2d 138, 434 P.2d 
1 HU ( l!J67). This expression of statutory construction is 
1 
/ further augmented by the State expression concerning 
1 
I the interpretation of criminal statutes in Section 76-1-2, 
1 11\ah Code Ann. ( 1953) , to-wit: 
i 
"The rule of common law that penal statutes 
are to he construed strictly has no application 
to these revised statutes. The provisions of these 
statutes are to be construed according to the fair 
7 
imr:ort of their terrns with a view to effect I/ii 
obJect of the stat.utes and to promote 1·11 .1 ... (E h . dd d) ' .S Ht mp as1s a e . · 
Therefore, the court should find that the urdinanct 
is not defectively vague, indefinite or over broad. It i\ 
well within the understanding of an average intellirrent 
b 
person and within the scope of statutory authority grant. 
ed to Salt Lake City. 
POINT II 
THE ORDINANCE REQUIRING WAR-
RANTLESS INSPECTIONS OF LICENSED 
PUBLIC :BEER TAVERNS ON PAIX OF LJ. 
CENSE REVOCATION IS A PROPER AXD 
CONSTITUTION AL EXERCISE OF CITY 
CONTROL. 
The germane issue of the case before the bar 1, 
whether or not a city may constitutionally require a beer 
licensee to permit police inspection of his licensed prr 
mises without a search warrant. The lower court fr 
panded and extrapolated the holding of two Supreme 
Court cases and ruled the ordinance unconstitutional 
the cases are: See v Seattle, 387 U.S. 541. 18 L.eiUI 
US '·13 JS !) .. i,a, and Municipal Court v Carnara, 387 . · .J.· · ' 
L.ed. 2d 930, 87 S.Ct. 1727 ( 1967). These cases art 
markedlv distinITuishable from the case before the 
and not. tive of the germane issue. fail 
was clearlv explained in the 196H Second Circuit c<iir 
Colonnad; Catering Corp. v. U. S., 410 F.2d J9i. 
8 
Here the Federal Government demanded the right 
lo inspect liquor bottles believed to be refilled and re-
sealed in violation of 18 U.S.C. §3731. The proprietor 
of a ballroom allowed free inspection of the dance hall 
area but refused the inspectors admittance to a locked 
closet stating that he had no key and demanding that 
the inspectors obtain a search warrant. The inspectors 
refused to obtain a warrant, and, under authority of 26 
['.S.C. 5H6b and 7606a, broke down the closet door. 
The Circuit Court noted that these federal laws 
allowed warrantless searches in liquor inspection cases 
and distinguished the See and Camara cases on the ex-
teptious noted in them by Justice White. The court 
further held the defendants gave their implied consent 
to allow inspection without a warrant. In so ruling, it 
rerersed the lower court's supression of evidence and 
remanded the case to trial. 
Significant to the Second Circuit in the Colonnade 
ease, supra, and language which exempts the dicta and 
holding of See and Camara from being determinatfre 
in the ease before the bar, is the following exception to 
11arrant procedure noted by Justice lVhite: 
"\Ve therefore conclude that administrative 
entry, without consent, 1tpon portions of com-
mercial premises which are not. open to the pub-
lic may only be compelled ... within the frame-
work of a warrant procedure. We do not in any 
way imply that the business premises may not 
reasonably be inspected in many more situations 
than private homes, nor do we question such 
9 
accepted reyulatury techniques w; licens1·11 . 
I . / . . . !J }JI 'J· yrmns w nc 1 require inspection prior to aper 1. .. 
1 
b . 1. • " Ii Ill'/ uszne:Ys or mar11·ettng :'product. See t Seatt/.; 
387 U.S. at p. 545, 54<6; 18 L.ed.2d 94i IE 
phasis added.); cited in Colonnade Cater·
1
u· 11 
C ( T S . ' /l/11 urp. v. ) . ., 410 I< .2d at p. 200. · I 
Here the Supreme Court exempts commercial pre· I 
mises open to the public from its holding and, aJ, 11 I 
licensing programs which require inspection prior 1i 1 
operating a business. The City ordinance in quesb11 11 
fits into both of these express exceptions. First. the 
licensed premises subject of this appeal is quasi publ1r 
in character, in that its patrons are invitees from tl1t 
public at large. Secondly, the ordinance is a regulutun 
one where violations are reported to the Board of Cil) 
Commissioners for the purpose of license revocatio11. 
Section 19-4-7, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake Gil!/· 
Utah ( 1965). Thirdly, the ordinance in question al· I 
lows as a precedent. I. 
for the opera hon of the busmess or marketmg the pro 
duct. Section 19-4-6, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lakt 
City, Utah (1965). , I 
Cities and states have long employed this type 01 · 
an inspection requirement as a legitimate method or 
control over businesses involved in the distribution of in· 
h · · t gTee that i toxicating beverages. All aut or1hes seem o a . 
. · b · ess 1n 1 the distribution of alcoholic beverages 1s a usm 
d b th New JPr1r1 need of special control. As state Y e 1 · ··1tl • 
Court in State v Zurawski, 88 N .J. Super. 488, 2la A. I 
566 ( 1965) : 
10 
"From the earliest history of our State, the 
s11le of intoxicating liquor has been dealt with 
by the Legislature in an exceptional way. Be-
cause of its sui generis nature and significance, 
it is a subject by itself, to the treatment of which 
all the analogies of the law, appropriate to other 
administrative agencies cannot be indiscrimi-
nately applied." 
This New Jersey Court further observed that the 
sale of intoxicating liquor is not a privilege guaranteed 
by any constitutional provision, but one subject to com-
plete prohibition and/ or regulation. See, Crawley v 
Chrisfonsen, 137 U.S. 86, 11 S.Ct. 113, 34 L.ed. 620 
, (1890). Therefore, it denied a motion to quash evidence 
seized under a law almost identical to the one under 
attack before this court. It said, "To do otherwise 
would thwart the legislative policy for strict control of 
a business said to be 'so prone to evils.'" Other courts 
hare almost unanimously upheld similar ordinances and 
declined to suppress evidence seized under them. See, 
Oh-lahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v Mc-
Culley, 377 P.2d 568, 570 (Okl. 1962) rehearing denied; 
Yuynto11 v State, 64 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1953); Gilber v 
Bloodgood, 188 N.,V. 84 ('Vis. 1922); Wibmer v State, 
195N.W. 936 (Wis. 1923); Solomon v Liquor Control 
Commfasion, 212 N.E.2d 595 (Ohio 1965), rehearing 
aenied; Fi<?cher v State, 74 A.2d 34 (Maryland 1950); 
Hur/en 11 Depm·tment of Liquor Control, 136 N.E.2d 
736, (Ohio 1955) . 
It is respectfully submitted the U. S. Supreme 
Court had these situations in mind, as well as others 
11 
noted in the Colonnade case, when it stated 1'ts . ca1eat 
concerning warrantless searches of public lJlace· · ! 
s il!il[ I 
those incident to license control. Supra at p. 8. 
I 
The rationale employed by the Supreme Couri '. 
in See and Camara was that of protecting those 
areas of privacy where the party against whom tnt i 
search was directed would not likely know the Jimiti ' 
of the inspection power or the scope of permitted searc11 
However, the U. S. Supreme Court stated it did nut. 
wish to require warrant procedure where to do so woula i 
frustrate a legitimate government interest. Municipal I 
Court v Camara, 387 U.S. at 533, 18 L.ed.zd at 938. 
In Colonnade, the Circuit Court agreed with tne 
underlying rationale of the Supreme Court and hel1l 
that the refilled and resealed bottles would hare bm 
removed; to require a warrant would have been disas· 
trous to the government interest of protecting gorern 
mental revenue. Also important to the Circuit Court 
was the fact that the right of search and its scope \\31 
restricted by statute; thus, individual rights were pro· 
tected. It was further noted that the liquor industf) j, 
a heavily regulated business and the court took judicial 
knowledge that, as such, the individuals charged knell 
the regulations affecting them and the scope of the in-
spectors' limited power; therefore, the warrantless search I 
was reasonable and, further, since the proprietors chose · 
to operate knowing of the government's inspection prnt· 
lege, they were deemed to have impliedly conseuterl 1" 
the warrantless search. The court said, 
12 
''The situation is substantially the same as if 
the dealer had knowingly entered into a contract 
waiving his right to privacy in those areas where 
he keeps and sells alcoholic beverages. Such a 
waiver with respect to subject matter in which 
the public has a special interest would be enforce-
able." Colonnade Catering Corp. v U. S., 410 
F.2d at p. 203. 
For these reasons, the Second Circuit rightly distin-
i guished See and Camara and upheld the warrantless 
search. 
In the case before the bar, the above arguments are 
even more persuasive in favor of the City ordinance. 
Here the inspection is: 
(a) Limited by ordinance to the "licensed pre-
mises"; i.e., that area described to the City in the licen-
see's application. Section 19-4-6, Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lah:e City, Utah ( 1965) . 
(b) The area to be inspected is quasi public in that 
patrons for the tavern are openly solicited from the 
general public. 
(c) The licensee applied for a license knowing of 
:he City ordinance requiring inspections of the premises. 
( d) The licensee is in the business of dispensing 
alcoholic beveraegs, a business subject to strict legisla-
tive control because it is "so prone to evils." State v 
Zurawski, 88 N.J. Super. 488, 215 A.2d 564 (1965). 
( e) The governmental purpose of control and 
regulating the licensee would be completely frustrated 
13 
by requiring a warrant before inspection· th1·8 ·, . . • ts espe. 
cially true smce a demand for inspection must ordinaril, 
be made before a warrant may issue 1.,"un".'' I ' :r1 /(/jli/I I 
Court v Camara, 387 U.S. at p. 539, 540; 18 i 
941. I 
I 
( f) The ordinance is not one of criminal searcn. j 
but regulatory in nature with the sanctions of limit 1 
reyocation for infractions. Section 19-4-7, Revised Or.' 
dinances of Salt Lah:e City, Utah (1965). 
(g) This case is not a search of a private residence. 
U. S. ·v Frisch, 140 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1944). 
( h) It is not a case to suppress evidence stemming 
from a search of private pockets or personal clothing. 
Pinn Liquor Shop, Inc., v State Liquor Authoril11, 
N.Y.2d 643, 249 N.E.2d 40 ( 1969). 
There are many areas where warrantless search i1 
not questioned. cf.: Border searches of one's baggage 
on entry into the U. S., 19 U.S.C. §1467, 1496, l.58i; i 
coal mine inspections, 30 U.S.C. §451-454; airport 
buildings, land and equipment inspections by C.A.B, 
49 U.S.C. §1377; See also other examples noted in 
Colonnade Catering Corp. v U. S., -HO F.2d at P· ZOl 
The ordinance in dispute fits iuto the reasoning arnl 
purpose which allows warrantless inspections in these 
areas. This court should follow the well-reasoned opinion 
l d. t' ish thr of the Second Circuit Court of Appea s, is mgu · 
I . t d d br Justice ! See and Camara case, as express y m en e . , 
14 
\\'hite, and find the ordinance a valid exercise of the 
City police power of regulation over taverns. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah municipal corporations have the absolute right 
1 
to either prohibit the sale of beer or control, license and 
regulate the businesses that sell it. Since the sale of beer 
is a privilege, the City may require, as a condition prece-
dent to obtaining a license, the right to inspect the li-
censed premises, Further, it has part of its regulatory 
and police power the right to inspect the premises to find 
riolations which may be grounds for license revocation. 
Salt Lake City has drafted such an ordinance, 
1rhich demands that licensed beer parlors allow warrant-
less inspections, in harmony with the statutory authority 
delegated by the State to it. The ordinance is clear to 
any reasonably intelligent person and requires the li-
censee to allow the police to inspect the licensed premises. 
It is clear and unambiguous in intent, meaning and 
scope; it is clearly not constitutionally vague, indefinite 
or overly broad. 
This ordinance requires licensess to allow inspec-
tion of only "public" beer parlors; that is, those who 
openly solicit patrons from the general public for the 
purpose of selling alcoholic beverages. Traditionally 
there has been no question concerning this type of ordi-
nance's validity in so far as the right of privacy and 
search and seizure warrants are concerned. Recent 
15 
Supreme Court decisions acknowledge this area as an 
exception to its expanded concept of warrant procedure 
and since it would frustrate a legitimate governmental 
interest to require a search warrant, the warrantless 
inspection is constitutional. Further, the tavern, tne 
licensees, consented to the warrantless inspection or 
seeking a license; thus, the ordinance and the 
under it are valid. 
Dated this 24th day of December, 1969. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
Assistant City Attorney 
101 City and County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84lll 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
Appellant 
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